Task: Develop technical safety concept
Definition of the technical safety architecture for the system, goes down to HW-SW implementation.
Purpose
To develop concepts that enable the system to achieve the ASIL level that its allocated technical safety requirements has inherited from the safety goals.
Relationships
Main Description

This task is used to define the architecture of the item according to the ASIL designation of the requirements that have been allocated to it and its respective subsystems.

The primary inputs to this phase are the functional concept, the technical safety requirements and the preliminary architectural assumptions. The consistency across these products with the technical safety concept shall be ensured.

The verifiability of the system design, the effectiveness of the HW and SW development and the systems testability through system integration should all be considered during the systems design and development.

It is recommended that developers examine ISO 26262 Vol 4, clause 7.4.1 through 7.4.5 in detail to fully appreciate the guidance on developing the technical safety concept.

The steps indicated in this section are summaries of considerations that need to be made and again it is advised that developers follow the guidelines indicated. 


Steps
Apply measures for the avoidance of systematic failures

Carry out deductive and inductive analysis methods as detailed in ISO 26262 Vol 9, Clause 8, to identify the causes and effects of systematic failures for these specific ASIL ratings.

Inductive methods such as FMEA, ETA and Markov modeling are highly recommended for items of all ASIL level.

Deductive methods such as FTA and reliability block diagrams are highly recommended for items with an ASIL of C or D, whilst these methods are recommended for items with an ASIL of B, with an unbiased opinion on its usage for items of ASIL A

It is intended that both deductive and inductive analysis techniques are employed. 

This information is a summary of the information taken from ISO 26262 vol 4 clause 7.4, Table 1-System design analysis.

The systemic failure analysis should cover sources of potential failures that exist internal and external to the system and the consequences of these failures shall be mitigated.

It is expected that well trusted design principles, components and interfaces should be applied and re-used to reduce the likelihood of failure associated with new designs. However it is expected that the suitability of these design principles or elements as potential solutions should be analyzed and the underlying assumptions checked before use. If the item has an ASIL D then the decision not to re-use a well trusted design principle should be justified.

In order to avoid failures due to high complexity the properties of modularity, adequate level of granularity and simplicity are required for items of  ASIL C and D are recommended for items of ASIL  A or B.

The properties applicable for modular system design are dependent on the ASIL of the item being developed. It i also intended that items under development should reflect all these properties in some way.

The property of hierarchical design is highly recommended for items of ASIL of C or D and recommend for items of ASIL A or B

The property of precisely defined interfaces is recommended for items of all ASIL levels

The property of avoidance of unnecessary complexity of HW and SW components is recommended for items of all ASIL levels

The property of avoidance of unnecessary complexity of interfaces is recommended for items of all ASIL levels

The property of maintainability during service is recommended for items of all ASIL levels

The property of testability during development and operation is highly recommended for items of ASIL of C or D and recommend for items of ASIL A or B

This information is a summary of the information taken from in ISO 26262 vol 4, clause 7.4.3. Table 2-Properties of modular system design



 

Apply measures for the control of random HW failures during operation

The guidelines for the measures of control of random hardware failures during operation are highly dependent upon ASIL rating for the specific safety requirement.

The only requirement that is applicable to all is that measures for detection and control, or mitigation of random hardware failures shall be specified with respect to the system design.

The remaining requirements in this clause are recommended for items with an ASIL B and required for items with an ASIL of C or D they cover the following aspects of the technical safety concept.

Target values for single and latent point  fault metrics (see ISO 26262, vol 5, Clause 8) shall be specified for final evaluation at the item level (see ISO 26262, vol 4, clause 9.4.3.3).

One of the alternative procedures of evaluation of violation of the safety goal due to random hardware failures (see ISO 26262 vol 5  Clause 9) shall be chosen and the target values shall be specified for final evaluation at item level (see ISO 26262, vol 4, clause 9.4.3.3).

Appropriate target values for failure rates and diagnostic coverage should be specified at element level in order to comply with the target values of the metrics (see ISO 26262, vol 5, Clause 8) and the procedures detailed in  ISO 26262 vol 5 clause 9.

For distributed developments the derived target values shall be communicated to each relevant party.

The other clauses of ISO 26262 that are referenced by this section are ISO 26262 vol 5:-

clause 8 Hardware architectural metrics

Clause 9 Evaluation of violation of the safety goal due to random HW failures.

Allocate technical safety requirements to system
Show that the system covers all the technical safety requirements based upon the technical safety concept
Key Considerations

Practices applicable to help develop the technical safety concept using model based techniques

These methods are applied at different levels of abstraction as you further develop the functional model to the technical model to the systems model and finally the HW/SW model, so they are used in many places throughout the systems development process.